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Abstract— Modern information technology offers significant 
support to the Intelligence Cycles (planning, collecting, analyzing 
of data and their dissemination), by promoting the appropriate 
and flexible use of information, its searchability and exploitation. 
Although Intelligence Information Systems can significantly 
improve current and generate new intelligence working 
protocols, they are confronted with a serious challenge – the 
security of the system and the circulated information. 
Optimization techniques in the context of game and control 
theory are some of the tools that offer mathematical support for 
the formalization of the decision-making processes related to 
networked systems security. Game theory has been recently 
recognized as a way around the problem of lacking a quantitive 
decision framework for the security issues, as well as a model that 
can address more efficiently the problem of computational 
complexity in simulations. 
Keywords— intelligence; information system; security; game 
theory; strategy; stochastic; defence;  
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Security analysis of IT systems becomes increasingly involved 
and demanding task, as the level of complexities rises with the 
ongoing innovations and applications. This has resulted in a 
large number of defense mechanisms against networked 
systems’ attacks, each of them employing a number of 
variables. In combining defense mechanisms, decisions often 
hinge on the tradeoff between the costs and the benefits of the 
mechanism to the system. On the other side, the attacker has to 
organize the resources around, for example, exploiting fast but 
easy detectable or slow but difficult to detect attacks. 
Networked systems are difficult to observe and control. 
Countless number of automated processes are running at each 
and every moment, hidden somewhere in the background, 
making connections and communicating with other computers 
in the network. With hardware and software highly complex 
nature being one of the reasons for security concerns, the 
ubiquitous presence of unintentional flaws in the software 
products are the accompanying cause. Additionally, the 
distributed architecture of modern networks prevent the 
administrator from implementing complete defense solutions 
and achieving full control over the system’s behavior in a 
network. 
 
The rising complexity of defense mechanisms has introduced 
various theoretical models for their construction and analysis. 
Such are the fields of probabilistic graph theory, machine 
learning, pattern recognition, cryptography, application of 
classification and clustering techniques. More recently, game 
theory has been used as a competing tool for dealing with the 
burden of high computational demands.  
Two global groups of actors are concerned with security issues 
of an information system: attackers (malicious users) and 
defenders (system administrators). Security games, being an 
attackers/defenders interaction model, have the ability of 
quantifying possible outcomes, determine availability of 
strategies as well as predicting possible future behavior. Their 
presentation can vary from simple, deterministic to complex, 
stochastic ones where the play proceeds through changing 
states, according to estimated transition probabilities.  
This article discusses game theoretical models for the 
treatment of Intelligence Information System (IIS) security 
issues. In Section II, a short description of a SOA-based IIS is 
given. Section III looks briefly into security issues of this 
model, Section IV gives a short introduction to security games 
and presents two different model concepts. In the last section 
we give some concluding remarks and discuss implementation 
challenges.  
 
II. INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION SYSTEM BASED 
ON SERVICE-ORIENTED ARCHITECTURE 
The Model of SOA-based Intelligence Information System 
(IIS) (Figure 1) is created to provide a comprehensive support 
to the intelligence process, its role and assignments. It 
encompasses three types of users: service providers, service 
consumers and Intelligence. Agencies, departments, 
institutions and other stakeholders can push and pull data on a 
standardized and flexible manner through communication 
interfaces using XML schema and web services. 
All services are getting information from appropriate 
service providers through Information Systems of the 
government institutions or the agencies which are included in 
the Intelligence Cycle. In addition, it is possible for other 
Information Systems to act as service providers for inter-
institutional governance. Service providers which support the 
workflow processes, define which web services can be 
exploited and define appropriate service registers’ security 
level. 
 
S
Intelligence Information System
Service providers:
- Intelligence Agency
- Department of Security and  
Counterintelligence 
- Military Service for Security 
and Intelligence 
Service consumers:
- President
- Parliament 
- Government 
Intelligence:
- OSINT
- SIGINT 
- MASINT
- IMINT
- ELINT 
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Figure 1: Model of SOA-based Intelligence Information System 
 
Intelligence is based on several disciplines: IMINT, 
SIGINT, MASINT, OSINT, etc. They fulfill their requirements 
by completing several tasks: information gathering 
(assessments, analyses, generating reports), verification and 
notification (e.g., political and security situation in foreign 
countries related to security of investments), etc. 
Our methodology of developing SOA-based Intelligence 
Information System consists of several postulates. 
The first postulate defines data exchanging methodology 
within SOA. It should be compatible with publicly described 
solutions for information systems which support intelligence 
functions. 
The second postulate focuses on the usage of SOA for 
information systems design, with the intention of finding 
relevance for developing Intelligence IIS. 
The third postulate describes end users’ functionalities for 
the IIS, which can be explored from different aspects. 
Intelligence, as an end user of IIS, is based upon intelligence 
disciplines which are further divided to sub-intelligence 
disciplines.  
The fourth postulate refers to the future development of the 
IIS. Information infrastructure should be adoptable and 
flexible in order to fully support information sharing process.   
The fifth postulate suggests the need for implementation of 
security standards for achieving adequate security level.  
These five postulates promote the SOA system as a most 
appropriate IT infrastructure for IIS purposes, with minimum 
requirements for designing services that are needed in the 
intelligence process and internal functions available for 
processing from external IIS peer [11]. 
 
III. SECURITY ISSUES OF A SOA-BASED IIS 
SECURITY GAMES) 
Networked systems’ security is subjected to acts that 
compromise its confidentiality, integrity and availability or to 
attempts for obtaining control over a computer or 
communication network. The types and the scale of security 
threats can vary according to the specific use of the system. A 
malicious attacker of an Intelligence System could exhibit 
activities towards information theft, information alteration, 
misinformation or system impairment. 
The IIS is a distributed computer system, which makes it 
prone to numerous security threats. Its most vulnerable points 
lie within the network connectivity, where the communication 
rules between the hardware, the software and the users are 
organized around protocols at different layers (such as 
application, transport, network, link and physical layer). From 
a security perspective, each of these protocols has weakness 
that could open a door to a malicious user: privacy concerns 
resulting from the poor authentication form of the HTTP, 
spoofed e-mail opportunities with SMTP, a large scale attack 
possibility due to the distributed architecture of DNS, denial 
of service (DoS) attack during client-server connection 
through TCP, poor security as a result of packages’ 
fragmentation in IP, collision and corruption of packages in 
the Ethernet protocol, ARP cache poisoning etc. 
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 Figure 2. Presentation of layers and data transport 
 
DoS attacks typically evolve in two parts. Firstly, the 
vulnerabilities of the system are exploited and second, attack 
tools (command messages) are installed through the network 
channels. The defense mechanisms that are proposed against 
DoS attacks can be divided into three groups of actions which 
are of preventive, detective and reactive nature. 
Other types of malicious attempts can compromise the 
confidentiality of the system through an unauthorized access to 
information, which can be stolen, modified or falsified. 
Malicious software can be used to compromise network nodes. 
Backdoors implanting, Port Scanning, Remote Password 
Cracking are some of the attacking tools. The types of attacks 
as well as possible defense mechanism against them have been 
widely discussed in the literature and we will, at this point, 
refrain from further discussion on the issue. 
IV. GAME THEORY AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
(SECURITY GAMES) 
The theory of games is a formal way of conducting interaction 
analysis within a group of rational, strategically behaved 
agents. During a game (or a play), the actions that are 
undertaken by a participant (i.e. player) influence, to a varying 
degree, the actions of her opponents. In addition, a specified 
amount of awareness of the game elements (including other 
agents’ strategies and utilities), as well as of rationality of the 
players, is assumed. Together with the action profiles space 
and the available knowledge structure, these elements make 
the constituting parts of an initial game description. 
By applying security game analysis, we try to detect 
appropriate protective countermeasures for the information 
system, obtain suggestions for effective resources allocation 
and analyze the behavior of the malicious agents that 
compromise the system’s security. A security game consists of 
four components: players, actions sets for each of the players, 
the outcome of each player interaction and the information 
structure of the game. In a two-player non-cooperative 
security game, we observe an attacker (A) and a defender (D), 
each with a set of available strategies, further on also referred 
to with A and D. 
The game matrices of A and D represent the estimated gain (or 
loss) of each player for pure strategy profiles. Having in mind 
the characteristics of an intelligence system, we consider the 
gain, for both of the players respectively, to be estimated in 
relation to a couple of general features: the availability (which 
refers to urgency, timeliness, connectivity etc.) and the quality 
of the information (including its significance for the observed 
issue, its accuracy and confidentiality).  
Two models of security games will be presented. The 
stochastic game model assumes variable state of game with 
knowledge about game elements, while the fictitious play (FP) 
process of game learning takes place in an invariable state of 
game, but without knowledge of adversaries’ profiles and 
utilities. The FP model still embodies an element of 
stochasticity, by taking into account the uncertainty of 
observations and decisions. Both models are discrete and 
produce probabilities of the expected attacker behavior, which 
are further used for assessing the security status of the system. 
The solution concept we adopt is the Nash Equilibrium (NE), 
where both players adopt strategies that are the best response 
to the strategy played by their opponent. Although this 
imposes strong assumptions about players’ rationality, it was 
shown (J.Nash 1950) that NE exists for finite n-player games, 
albeit not always in pure strategies. The (stochastic) fictitious 
play process has also good convergence properties for two-
player games (see for example [2], [3], [6]) 
 
A. Stochastic Game Security Model 
The stochastic nature of the game intends to capture the 
complexities and/or unknown parameters of the security 
problem at hand. A typical stochastic security game scenario 
takes place in a networking computer environment, with 
application servers, database servers, firewalls, cryptographic 
devices etc. In a SOA-based IIS, services possess individual 
targeting specifics as well.  
The type of hardware, software, bandwidth, user privileges, 
connectivity etc. describe the state of the system, which 
changes according to situation developments. A state can be 
the operational modus of the networked system (functionality 
of the units, node connectivity, users’ privileges, active 
countermeasures, compromised parts of the system etc.) The 
more detailed the state presentation is, the more accurate but 
complex and difficult to analyze the model will be. States can 
be encoded in the model in various ways. By using for 
example, a binary representation scheme (1 for active and 0 
for inactive components of the system), each of these states 
could be represented as a binary string of a finite length.  
Let { }n21 S,,S,SS …=  be a finite set of states with a given 
initial probability distribution ( )n1 p,,p …=0p . At a period t, 
the system will be in one of the states ( ) Sts ∈ . The transition 
from one state to another is governed by probability 
distributions, which depend on the outcome of the immediate 
game. In reality, some of the transitions will be infeasible, 
which will be expressed by a zero value of the corresponding 
transition probability. If we define pij to be the probability of 
game’s environment transit from state Si to the state Sj, then 
we have 1p
n
1j
ij =∑
=
. 
For each pair of actions (a,d), a∈A, d∈D, a state transition 
probability matrix MT(a,d) of order n2 is given. The 
probability description of the system’s status will change 
according to 
 ( ) ( ) ( )tp1tp ⋅=+ d,aTM .       (1) 
 
The utility function L of the game reflects the anticipated 
defender’s loss as a result of attacker’s actions. Its value can 
otherwise be interpreted as attacker’s gain. Clearly, D wants to 
minimize the value of L, while at the same time A tries to 
maximize it. The overall setting is that of a zero-sum game. 
We will observe the game from the viewpoint of the defender 
and further on, we will refer to L as the loss function. 
Let the game loss matrix for each Sj∈S be given with ( ) ( ) Aia,Did]a,d[SG iij ∈∈= jl 1 where the value of ( )ii a,djl  is 
the expected outcome loss for the defender when the action 
profile ( )ii a,d  is played. If in time period t the game is in a 
state ( ) Sts ∈ , then the game matrix will be 
( )( ) ( ) ( ){ }n1 SG,,SGtsG …∈ . The average loss for D in a finite 
τ-stage game is estimated by 
 
( ) ( ) ( )∑τ
=
⋅=
1t
tOtL tpk ,      (2) 
 
where O(t) is the NE outcome value of the game at stage s(t), 
( ) ( ))t()t(t ,O αδ= l  with δ(t), αt) being the optimal strategies 
(pure or mixed) for D and A at time t. The weighting 
coefficients ( )tpk  represent the probability that the system is 
in state Sk at time t, according to (1).   
The solution algorithm for the game can be formulated by a 
dynamic programming approach. Using recursion, we can 
inductively obtain the expressions for the optimal value and 
                                                          
1 Since not all of the actions are applicable in a given state, some of 
the rows’(columns’) elements of this matrix may be zeros i.e. the 
order of the matrix may be less than |D|×|A|. 
the total discounted costs respectively for player D in a state 
s∈S at stage t, 
 
( ) ( ) ( )da,d,sLmaxminsV s
Dd
tAas
µ⋅= ∑
∈∈µ
, where          (3)  
 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )∑
∈
⋅⋅β+=
Ss'
s,s'TM 'sVd,asGa,d,sL d,at ,        (4) 
 
for all  t = 1,2,….,  µ a mixed strategy for D and [ )1,0∈β  an 
estimated discount factor. When satisfactory convergence 
criteria are met, we can obtain from (3) and (4) the optimal 
defense strategy Sµ  and the value L  (i.e. the loss) that D can 
expect. The dual (maximin) formulation to this model will 
provide the optimal attack strategy for A. 
We can now formulate the algorithm for solving a stochastic 
security game. 
Value iteration algorithm for a stochastic security game. 
1. For all s∈ S, d∈D, a∈A enter values for L0(s,d,a); 
2. Calculate V(s) 
3. repeat 
4.   for d∈D, a∈A do 
5.        update L(s,d,a) according to (**) 
6.        update V(s) according to (*) 
7.    end for 
8. until  convergence of V(s) 
 
B. Fictitious Play Security Model 
In practice, game engagement is often accompanied by lack of 
knowledge about the opponents or inaccuracy of the received 
information, or both. When we lack specific knowledge about 
our opponents, than we cannot a priori formulate a sustained 
opinion about their future actions, the personal utilities related 
to them and consequently, the mixed strategy they will 
consider the most beneficial. On the other hand, sensor 
systems that are supposed to report an attack are imperfect and 
there is always a positive probability for a false positive or 
negative attack alerts on both sides. Furthermore, the 
rationality of the players is not error prone as well, and if these 
factors are summed up then considering an incomplete 
information game becomes a must. 
Once involved in a game, a way out of this situation is to 
proceed according to observations by trying to determine the 
best move for our gains. When applying a fictitious play 
updating of the game knowledge, we assume that our 
opponents’ play unrolls according to a defined, but unknown 
strategy distribution. Players have no access to the other’s 
player utility function and adjust their strategy choice 
according to the observations. In such circumstances, the IIS 
defender will proceed as follows: 
(a) Count the appearance of each attacking action ai and 
generate an associate frequency value ν(ai), 
(b) Create the related empirical probabilities for each 
observed attacking action in period t, 
 
                 ( ) ( )( )∑
=
ν
ν= k
1j
j
i
i
a
atp
            (5) 
(c) Update the mixed strategy profile of the attacker, 
( ) ( ) ( )( )tp,,tpt k1 …=γ , 
(d) Calculate her best response to this profile according 
to her game matrix D, 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )µρ+γµ=β
µ
HtDmaxargt T ,  and           (6) 
(e) Observe the next attacker’s move. 
 
Here, µ is strategy profile of D, H is the entropy function 
given by ( ) ( )µ⋅µ−=µ logH T  which covers for the uncertain 
observations and decisions and ρ is a non-negative parameter 
expressing D’s tendency toward randomization of her actions. 
It is assumed that on the opposite side, the attacker is applying 
the same procedure resulting in a subsequent best response 
action. 
For strictly positive values of ρ in (6), the FP model is 
stochastic. If both players set a zero value for this parameter, it 
will remove the stochasticity and result in the classical FP 
model. The most important implication is that in the later case 
we can expect a set-valued result from the best response 
maximization, while in the former case the resulting best 
response strategy is unique. 
Fictitious play algorithm. 
1. Given a payoff matrix, 
2.    for t = 1, 2, … 
3.       update the actions’ empirical frequency of the 
opponent, 
4.         pick an optimal pure strategy from ( )   
(randomizing the choice if needed), 
5.     end for 
In [15], a time-invariant model of stochastic fictitious play for 
security games has been considered and asymptotic stability 
results for the dynamics have been given. This approach is 
inspired by the realistic expectations that firstly, players would 
want to take individual time steps for the next move instead of 
synchronizing their actions and secondly, they would tend 
toward adjusting the history of the play by weighting observed 
actions, thus speeding up the strategic convergence towards 
equilibrium. Whereas in the time-variant model presented 
above we have an updating equation for the observed 
opponent play given by 
 
( ) ( ) ( )ts
t
t
t
tt
1
1
1
1 +++=+ γγ ,   (7) 
 
the time-invariant version gives the following estimation: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )tstt ⋅+⋅−=+ ηγηγ 11   (8) 
 
for some η ∈(0,1). In the equations above, s(t) is the pure 
strategy unit vector. 
The mean dynamic of the time-invariant FP for each of the 
players is given by 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )ttt ii −⋅+⋅−=+ γβηγηγ 11   (9) 
 
where i stands for either of the defending or attacking player, -
i for the opposite player and β for the respective player’s best 
response. The mean dynamics of the empirical strategic 
frequencies will thus be calculated according to 
 
     ( ) ( ) ( )( )t
t
t
t
tt iii −+++=+ γβγγ 1
1
1
1 ,  { }D,Ai∈ . (10) 
 
The mean dynamic of the time-invariant model is shown to be 
asymptotically stable for estimated values of the parameter η. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Security of a networked system is a problem that is far from 
its final solution. Even if a good defense model comes at hand, 
it is very likely that it will soon be outsmarted by some 
inspired and not well-minded user, which can be somewhere 
far on the world wide web and quite beyond the control of 
those who are supposed to defend the system (the 
administrators). Braking complex encryption schemes or 
performing various deceptive actions is not so uncommon 
nowadays, so pushing and pulling information trough a 
network becomes a high risk endeavor. 
In a SOA-based Intelligence Information System, networked 
system’s security vulnerabilities are emphasized by concerns 
of even higher level, due to the nature and significance of the 
circulated information. Its defense strategies should be 
developed and analyzed very carefully, always with a thought 
that there is no perfect mechanism i.e. a solution to all security 
challenges.  
In this context, game theory emerges as a useful and cost-
effective tool for analysis, prediction and planning of defense 
activities. It can offer a way around the problem of lacking a 
quantitive decision framework, such is the case with other 
network security solutions. This is especially important when 
having in mind that intelligent, proactive adversaries are often 
at hand, which could render some of the other mathematical 
analyzing tools inapplicable or exceptionally consuming. The 
use of games in analyzing security issues creates opportunities 
for examining numerous attack scenarios, calculating possible 
outcomes and suggesting directions for the future course of 
actions. 
Computer implementation of security game models has 
already been considered, implemented and discussed in the 
literature. It provides for an automated decision process which 
significantly contributes to the security treatment. The models 
presented in this article have both advantages and 
disadvantages. A state-dependent model such as the stochastic 
game, can provide for a more authentic game environment but 
on the flip side, the state space can be very large. To simplify 
the calculations, we may be compelled to restrict to a much 
smaller subset of states and consider suitable presentation 
patterns for them. In addition, determining the actions of both 
parties, in particular of the attacker, is another challenge for 
the model building. Opponent’s true strategy set is especially 
case sensitive in the FP model, since the concept does not 
account for actions that have not been previously observed, 
even though they might be very plausible. 
The future challenges are related to the implementation of 
game models to the specifics of the IIS setting and its service-
oriented architecture.  SOA components are loosely coupled 
and exposed as independent services on a network. The 
intelligence disciplines that are related to the services of the IIS 
involve human, image, signal, open source and other types of 
intelligence analysis, employing diverse resources which differ 
both in nature and functionality.  In this light, a successful 
model will develop around a good quantitative estimation of 
parameters, carefully specified attitude towards inevitable 
tradeoffs (prioritize security, system performance, utilities, 
defense costs or other important features), testing of various 
defense techniques and their combinations through simulation 
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